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Abstract
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical charac-
teristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in
the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms
know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative
advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative
advertising firms may signal the quality differential. In both scenar-
ios the firms may attempt to mislead at a cost. If firms advertise,
in both scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative adver-
tising the firms never advertise together which they may do under
non-comparative advertising.
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1 Introduction
Comparative advertising was illegal in many European countries until the
late 1990s. By contrast, in the US comparative advertising has been encour-
aged by the Federal Trade Commission since the 1970’s. A 1997 EU directive
(Directive 97/55/EC) changed the situation in Europe by legalizing compar-
ative advertising subject to the restriction that it should not be misleading.
European Competition Authorities now tend to agree with their American
counterparts in that comparative advertising is an important tool in promot-
ing competition. Comparative advertising increases consumers’ information
about alternative products. It allows consumers to evaluate the performance
of particular products against other products, thus enabling more informed
purchasing decisions.1
Despite its importance there has been little economic analysis on compar-
ative advertising. We will review this literature at the end of the introduction.
In this paper we address the following questions. Is the content of compara-
tive advertisement more truthful than the content of non-comparative adver-
tisements? Are comparative ads more informative for consumers than non-
comparative ads? Is the amount of advertising higher or lower under com-
parative or non-comparative advertising? Can the two advertising regimes
be compared using welfare criteria?
To answer these questions we consider a product with a horizontal and a
vertical characteristic. We call the horizontal characteristic design and the
vertical one quality. Consumers have different tastes concerning design but
all consumers prefer higher to lower quality. Two firms produce opposite
designs. To focus on advertising we consider a situation where prices cannot
signal qualities. In equilibrium, the two firms charge identical prices which
are low enough so that the market is always covered. The difference in the
quality levels determines how the firms share the market. If both firms have
1See Barigozzi and Peitz (2006) for more details.
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the same quality level, they share the market equally. If one firm has a higher
quality level than its opponent, it has a higher market share. The quality
differential defines a zero-sum game between the two firms.
Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative
advertising a firm may send a message about its own quality but not about
the competitor’s one. Under comparative advertising firms may signal the
quality differential. In both scenarios the firms attempt to mislead at a cost.
The cost of misleading increases the further a firm moves away from the
truth, i.e., the more a firm makes exaggerated claims. Moreover, in both
scenarios firms may choose not to advertise.
In the non-comparative framework a firm advertises if its quality level is
above a threshold. In the message it boasts about its quality level. Con-
sumers rationally anticipate this boasting and infer the true quality level.
Thus, if firms advertise, the equilibrium is revealing, yet firms attempt to
mislead. Stated differently, because the marginal cost of slightly distorting
the truth is negligible but the marginal return is not, consumers expect some
boasting, leading firms to do so systematically. If the quality level is below
the threshold, a firm does not advertise; the cost of sending the message is
higher than the gain thereof. If both firms have low quality levels, both do
not advertise and share the market equally. If one firm has a high quality
level whereas the other one has a low one, the high quality firm advertises
while the low quality one doesn’t. The high quality firm has more customers
than the low quality one. If both firms have high quality levels, both ad-
vertise. The last case may be highly inefficient: if both firms have the same
high quality level, both advertise at a cost yet still share the market.
Under comparative advertising firms may send signals about the quality
differential. An advertising firm wants to persuade consumers that the qual-
ity differential is in its favor. Again firms may distort the truth at a cost.
If the quality differential is sufficiently small, both firms do not advertise.
If the quality differential is, however, large, the high quality firm advertises
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while the low quality one doesn’t. If a firm advertises, it attempts to boost
the quality differential in its favor. Consumers account for this and infer the
true value. In equilibrium the firms never advertise together.
In our equilibria if firms advertise, the signalling cost is minimal. This, in
turn, implies that the range over which firms choose to advertise is maximal.
Therefore, we have chosen in both scenarios out of the set of possible equi-
libria the least-cost maximum-advertising ones. Since both equilibria share
these features, a comparison of their efficiency properties is reasonable.
Comparative advertising tends to perform better than non-comparative
advertising in our set-up. Firms do not advertise if the quality differential
is small and the information is of little value to consumers. If, however,
the quality differential is large, the high quality firm advertises while the
low quality one remains silent. There is no duplication of advertisement ex-
penditures. By contrast, under non-comparative advertising firms advertise
their high quality independently of their rival’s quality level. Both firms may
advertise even when the information is of little or no value to consumers.
Non-comparative advertising results in a two-sender simultaneous sig-
nalling game with a continuum of types where a type is given by the true
quality. Comparative advertising yields a two-sender game with perfectly
correlated types, i.e., the actions of both firms provide information about
the same quantity. Since signals are non-stochastic, the true state is inferred
in both contexts if firms advertise.
Let us now review the literature. The marketing literature has discussed
comparative advertising quite extensively; see Grewal et al. (1997) for a
survey. There is, however, little economics literature on comparative ad-
vertising. Aluf and Shy (2001) use a Hotelling-type model. Comparative
advertising shifts transportation cost to the rival’s product. The model does
not deal with the informative role of advertising.
Anderson and Renault (2006) consider comparative advertising with re-
spect to horizontal characteristics. If qualities are sufficiently different, the
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low quality firm will disclose horizontal attributes of both products. The
main difference to our approach is that advertising is costless and firms can
only communicate verifiable evidence but may attempt to milslead by dis-
closing only what they see fit.
Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2007) consider an incumbent with known
quality facing an entrant with unknown quality. The entrant can choose
generic advertising which is standard money burning to signal quality. More-
over, the entrant can choose comparative advertising which involves a com-
parison of the two firms’ qualities. If the entrant uses comparative advertis-
ing, the incumbent may sue hoping to obtain damages. If the entrant uses
comparative rather than generic advertising, he signals to consumers that he
has a strong case. It turns out that comparative advertising can signal qual-
ity in those cases where generic advertising cannot. An important difference
to our model is that only the entrant can choose to advertise.
More generally, our analysis is related to the industrial organization liter-
ature on advertising as quality disclosure or quality signalling. Levin, Peck,
and Ye (2009) analyze a duopoly where firms can disclose their true quality
by presenting costly verifiable evidence in the form of, e.g., certification from
a third party. In Daughety and Reinganum (2008), a monopolist may choose
between costly disclosure or signalling quality through prices.
There is an important literature, going back to Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), on quality signalling via prices or advertising as money burning. By
and large, however, this literature has dealt with the case of a monopolist,
i.e., it has considered a one-sender game. A recent exception is Daughety and
Reinganum (2007) who consider signalling through prices in a duopoly. Two
other exceptions, more closely related to the present analysis, are Hertzen-
dorf and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002). In these papers,
as in the present one, the duopolists know each other’s quality. In the re-
sulting equilibria, signalling is either through prices alone or through the
price-advertising mix. In the present paper, signalling through prices is not
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feasible. Moreover, we focus on the case where both firms may jointly signal
about the same quantity, namely the quality differential.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the model. Section 3 analyzes non-comparative and section 4
comparative advertising. Section 5 compares welfare. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a product that has two characteristics. The first is horizontal; we
will call it design. Design can take on two values d ∈ {−1,+1}. A computer
may use the Mac OS X or the Microsoft Windows operating system; a vaca-
tion resort may be located in the mountains or at the seaside; a cigar may
be produced in Cuba or the Dominican Republic. The second characteristic
is vertical; we will refer to it as the product’s quality. Let qd ∈ [0, 1] be the
quality of design d. We will write qm for the quality of d = −1 (m for minus)
and qp for the quality of d = +1 (p for plus).
Consumers have unit demand. They care about design and quality. A
consumer’s utility is given as
U = θd+ 2qd + 1,
where θ is uniform on [−θ̂, θ̂], θ̂ > 1, or explicitly
U =
{
θ + 2qp + 1, if d = 1;
−θ + 2qm + 1, if d = −1.
The parameter θ measures the intensity with which a consumer cares about
design. If θ is close to zero, design is not of great importance for the consumer
and he cares more about quality. By contrast, if θ is close to θ̂ (−θ̂), the
consumer is a d = 1 (d = −1) aficionado for whom quality is of minor
importance. The larger θ̂, the more the average consumer cares about design.
θ is private information.2
2The average of |θ|, i.e., the average preference intensity for one design or the other, is
θ̂/2.
6
There are two firms: firm m offers design −1 and firm p design +1.3 Both
firms charge the price of 1 for their product. Below we provide a justification
for why firms do not engage in price competition. When he purchases the
product, a consumer’s net utility is U minus the price; otherwise, it is zero.
With unit prices, each consumer buys the product for all possible realizations
of quality so that the market is covered. Which design a consumer chooses
depends on his θ and the difference in quality levels: the consumer θ buys
from firm p if θ+2qp ≥ −θ+2qm or θ ≥ −(qp−qm) := −x where x = qp−qm
is the quality differential.
Production costs are normalized to zero so that each consumer generates
a profit, net of advertising costs, of 1. Firm m’s profit (market share) net of
advertising cost is ∫ −x
−θ̂
1
2θ̂
dθ =
1
2
− x
2θ̂
.
Firm p’s profit is ∫ θ̂
−x
1
2θ̂
dθ =
1
2
+
x
2θ̂
.
If qm = qp, equivalently x = 0, both firms share the market; if qm < qp or
x > 0, firm p has more than half of the market; if qm > qp or x < 0, firm
m has more than half of the market. The quality difference defines a zero-
sum game between the two firms. The marginal impact of x on profits is
+(−)1/2θ̂: the less consumers care about design (the smaller θ̂), the higher
the impact of the quality differential.
Consumers know the designs but do not observe the quality levels: the
products are experience goods and consumers find out the actual quality only
after they have purchased.4 We assume that q̃m and q̃p are independent and
uniform on [0, 1]. Both firms know the realizations qm, qp whereas consumers
3Abusing notation we will use d ∈ {−1,+1} when we refer to design in the consumers’
utility function and d ∈ {m, p} as an index for firms and quality levels.
4As in Milgrom and Roberts (1986), quality may be interpreted as the probability
that a consumer is fully satisfied with the product, which is non verifiable. Therefore, a
warranty is not feasible.
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do not. Without any additional information consumers expect E(q̃m) =
E(q̃p) = .5 and the firms share the market. Unless qm = qp, this allocation is
inefficient. If consumers learn, say, x > 0, then consumers with θ ∈ [−x, 0]
buy from firm p rather than firm m. When they buy from m, their surplus
is
∫ 0
−x(−θ+ 2qm)/2θ̂ dθ; buying from p generates the surplus
∫ 0
−x(θ+ 2(qm +
x)/2θ̂ dθ. Becoming informed about x thus increases surplus by x2/2θ̂. This
expression also applies when x < 0.
Informing consumers about quality therefore not only redistributes prof-
its, but typically also enhances efficiency. To put it differently, advertising
quality in our set-up is on the one hand combative, acting to redistribute con-
sumers among firms; on the other hand it is informative, increasing consumer
surplus.5
To complete the set-up, we describe a simple framework where both prod-
ucts are priced at 1 in equilibrium. Suppose that, in addition to the qual-
ity conscious consumers just described, there is for each firm a mass M of
quasi captive consumers who do not care about quality. The first (second)
group consists of consumers with U = 1 if they purchase design m (p) and
U = ε < 1/2 if they purchase design p (m). If one firm sets its price equal to
1, its rival can attract all the quality indifferent consumers only by setting a
price at most equal to ε. The poacher’s profit with respect to quality indif-
ferent consumers amounts to 2εM , which is less than the profit of M earned
by setting a price of 1 and selling only to its own quasi captive clientele. In
the absence of quality conscious consumers, the Bertrand equilibrium prices
are therefore equal 1.
Consider now the population of quality conscious consumers. Suppose
for the time being that quality is observable before purchase. If the market
consists only of quality conscious consumers, the equilibrium prices for m
and p are Pm = 2θ̂ − 2x/3 and Pp = 2θ̂ + 2x/3. Prices are higher the
more the average consumer cares about the horizontal characteristic, as this
5For a survey of the different views on advertising see, e.g., Bagwell (2007).
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reduces the intensity of price competition. Prices also depend on the quality
differential. Since θ̂ > 1 and x ∈ [−1, 1], both prices are strictly greater than
unity.
Finally, let the actual market consist of both categories of consumers.
Each product is sold at a uniform price, i.e., firms cannot discriminate be-
tween quality conscious and quality indifferent consumers. Depending on
the relative weights of the two categories, equilibrium prices are then either
Pm = 2θ̂ − 2x/3 and Pp = 2θ̂ + 2x/3 or Pm = Pp = 1. The latter occurs
when the mass 2M of consumers with extreme brand loyalty is sufficiently
large compared to that of quality conscious consumers. We assume this to
be the case.6 The resulting equilibrium prices also apply when quality is
unobservable: a firm never has an incentive to set a price different from
unity.7
In the sequel, we disregard prices and analyze how firms compete through
advertising in order to increase their market share of quality conscious con-
sumers. The timing is as follows. In stage 0, the firms learn their qualities
and consumers learn their type. In stage 1, the firms simultaneously send
messages about the qualities; this includes the possibility of saying nothing.
In stage 2, consumers observe the messages, draw inferences, and make their
purchase decisions.
3 Non-comparative advertising
In this section each firm may inform consumers about its own quality but
not about the quality of its competitor.8 It advertises its own quality by
sending a message of the form yd ≥ 0, d ∈ {m, p}. It should be thought of as
6If the set of quality conscious has unit mass, the condition is M > θ̂ + 2/3 + 1/9θ̂.
7Note that prices cannot signal quality because purchases are one-shot and unit costs
are independent of quality; see, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum, 2007.
8In our set-up no, one, or both firms may advertise. In Barigozzi, Garella, amd Peitz
(2007) the incumbent’s quality is common knowledge and only the entrant may signal
quality.
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a story or argument rendering qd plausible: the larger yd, i.e., the “louder”
the message, the more the firm claims about its quality.
The cost of advertising is related to actual quality qd. We assume it to
be of the form C(yd, qd) = γ + .5(yd − qd)2. γ ∈ (1/8θ̂, 1/4θ̂) is a fixed
cost of advertising.9 The variable cost captures the idea that a distorting
message is more costly than simply reporting the naked truth as it involves
more fabrication. With the quadratic function the cost of misrepresenting
the evidence increases at an increasing rate the more disconnected claims
are from the truth: it becomes more difficult to produce the corresponding
message, or advertising agencies charge more the more they embellish. When
firms are restricted to advertise their own quality, they are obviously only
interested in boasting, i.e., yd ≥ qd.10 Note that the marginal cost of sending
the signal yd is decreasing in the true quality so that the single-crossing
property is satisfied. If firm d does not advertise, we will write ∅d.
In the first stage of the game firms choose simultaneously whether or not
to advertise. In the second stage consumers observe the firms’ actions and
form beliefs E(x) = E(qp|·) − E(qm|·). Consumers then buy from the firm
maximizing expected utility, i.e., consumers with θ < E(x) buy design m
and the rest design p. If firm m doesn’t advertise, its profit is .5−E(x)/2θ̂;
if it sends the message ym profit is .5−E(x)/2θ̂− γ− .5(ym− qm)2. Firm p’s
profits are correspondingly .5 +E(x)/2θ̂ and .5 +E(x)/2θ̂− γ− .5(yp− qp)2.
Firms choose their advertising strategy so as to maximize expected profits.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria with minimum signalling costs.
The random variables q̃m and q̃m are independent meaning that the obser-
vation of the realization qm provides no information about the realization of
9The upper bound on γ ensures that firms advertise at all, the lower bound guarantees
that under comparative advertising firms never advertise together; see below.
10Alternatively, we could have specified the cost function as γ if yd < qd and γ+ .5(yd−
qd)2 otherwise. Since our choice of C(·) is everywhere differentiable, working with this
specification simplifies the exposition. Moreover, in the next section firms send signals
about the quality differential x; here they have an incentive to distort up- and downwards
and we can continue to use C(·).
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qp and vice versa. We consider equilibria where this independence property
carries over to the signals send by the firms. We assume that consumers’
expectation E(qm) depends only on firm m’s actions and is independent of
what firm p does; E(qp) is a function of firm p’s choices and is independent
of what firm m does. This approach has the advantage of ruling out even
implicit comparative advertising.11
Let us now derive the least cost signalling strategies y(qd), d ∈ {m, p}.
Suppose firms play a revealing strategy ŷ(qd) for some qd ≥ q0 where q0 is a
threshold yet to be determined. Revealing means E(qd|ŷ(qd)) = qd. Consider,
say, firm p and denote by π(yp, qp) its profit when it sends the message yp
and its actual quality is qp. If firm p wants to mimic as q
′
p, its profit is
π(ŷ(q′p), qp) =
1
2
+
1
2θ̂
[q′p − E(qm|·)]− γ −
1
2
(ŷ(q′p)− qp)2
=
q′p
2θ̂
− 1
2
(ŷ(q′p)− qp)2 + constant
where the constant denotes the terms that do not depend on p’s actions or
type. Since the strategy is revealing, firm p’s profit must be maximized at
q′p = qp. This implies that for all qp in the separating range
∂π
∂q′p
∣∣∣∣
q′p=qp
=
1
2θ̂
− (ŷ(qp)− qp)ŷ′(qp) = 0 and
∂2π
∂q′2p
∣∣∣∣
q′p=qp
= − (ŷ(qp)− qp)ŷ′′(qp)− (ŷ′(qp))2 ≤ 0.
If ŷ(qp) is revealing, it must solve the first-order and satisfy the second-
order condition. It is easier to work with the inverse function qp = ϕ(yp),
noting that the inverse exists since ŷ(qp) must be strictly increasing. In terms
of the inverse, the conditions are rewritten as
ϕ′(yd)− 2θ̂ (yd − ϕ(yd)) = 0 and (1)
11In effect our equilibrium strategies are the same as if each firm could only oberve its
own quality.
11
ϕ′′(yd) ≤ 2θ̂. (2)
The general solution to the differential equation (1) is
ϕ(yd) = Ke
− 2θ̂yd + yd −
1
2θ̂
(3)
where K is a constant. Condition (2) requires
Ke− 2θ̂yd ≤ 1
2θ̂
. (4)
Signalling costs (excluding the fixed cost) are
1
2
(yd − ϕ(yd))2 =
1
2
(
1
2θ̂
−Ke− 2θ̂yd
)2
.
Next we derive the threshold q0 at which the firm starts to advertise. Let
y0 be the smallest message sent, corresponding to q0. Signalling costs are
minimized if y0 = q0. This implies
K =
e2θ̂y0
2θ̂
=
e2θ̂q0
2θ̂
.
Observe that (4) is then always satisfied given that yd ≥ q0.
We can now rewrite (3) as
qd = yd −
1− e−2θ̂(yd−q0)
2θ̂
.
It is easily verified that yd is strictly increasing in qd, with y0 = q0; see the
discussion below.
When the firm does not advertise, consumers’ expectation about its qual-
ity is E(qd|∅d) = q0/2. The firm’s profit is then
π(∅d) =
(q0/2)
2θ̂
+ constant.
The threshold is such that a firm with actual quality q0 is just indifferent
between advertising and not. If it does, its profit is
π(y0) =
q0
2θ̂
− γ + constant.
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Indifference between advertising and not yields q0 = 4θ̂γ. A firm with quality
above this threshold prefers to advertise, the converse holds if quality is below
the threshold.
Equilibrium strategies are, therefore, ∅d if qd < 4θ̂γ and yd ≥ qd satisfying
qd = yd −
1− e−2θ̂(yd−4θ̂γ)
2θ̂
(5)
when qd ≥ 4θ̂γ.
Equilibrium beliefs are E(qd | ∅d) = 2θ̂γ and
E(qd | yd) = yd −
1− e−2θ̂(yd−4θ̂γ)
2θ̂
, for yd ≥ 4θ̂γ.
Quality is perfectly revealed in this case.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs need to be defined only for a message yd < 4θ̂γ.
One possibility is
E(qd | yd) ≤ yd, for yd < 4θ̂γ.
To sum up:
Proposition 1: In the least-cost equilibrium if qd < 4θ̂γ, firm d chooses ∅d;
consumers correctly expect E(qd | ∅d) = 2θ̂γ. If qd ≥ 4θ̂γ, firm d sends the
message yd ≥ qd solving (5); consumers infer the true quality level qd, d ∈
{m, p}.
The outcome is depicted in Figure 1. If both firms have quality levels
below 4θ̂γ, both do not advertise. Consumers rationally expect quality 2θ̂γ
of each firm. The more dispersed consumers (the higher θ̂) or the higher the
fixed cost γ, the larger the non-advertising range. If one firm’s quality level
is below while the other firm’s is above this threshold, the high quality one
advertises while the low quality one doesn’t. Consumers infer the quality
of the advertising firm and expect 2θ̂γ of the non-advertising one. When
both quality levels are above the threshold, both firms advertise. Consumers
infer both quality levels and thus the true quality differential. The game has
13
prisoners’ dilemma features. If, say, qm = qp > q0, both firms advertise yet
share the market. They spend resources on boasted messages without raising
consumer surplus.
pq
mq
( , )m py y
1
1
( , )m py( , )m p
( , )m py
ˆ4
Figure 1: Non-comparative advertising
ˆ4
Let us now look at the message yd in more detail. Solving (5) yields
yd = qd +
1
2θ̂
(1 + ProductLog(−e2θ̂(4θ̂γ−qd)−1)
where the ProductLog is the inverse function of f(w) = wew.12 We have
yd(q0) = q0, i.e., at the threshold q0 = 4θ̂γ the firm signals the true qual-
ity at zero variable cost. For qd ∈ (q0, 1], yd(qd) ∈ (qd, qd + 1/2θ̂). Firms
boast quality; boasting increases with quality, yet at a decreasing rate. See
Figure 2. Except for the threshold, if a firm advertises, it falsifies. For
yd > yd(q0), E(qd|yd) is strictly monotone in yd: different qd’s give rise to dif-
ferent yd’s to which consumers react by computing the correct expectation.
Given E ′(qd|yd) 6= 0 and the marginal cost of lying is zero around the true
value, it pays for firm d to falsify if it advertises.
12See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambert’s W function for more on the Pro-
ductLog.
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dq
y
0q
0q
( )dy q
1 2θ
Figure 2: The least cost signalling strategy ( )dy q
d∅
Two remarks are in order. First, under a properness restriction on con-
sumers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs an equilibrium cannot be totally unreveal-
ing (Myerson (1978)). To see this, suppose on the contrary that consumers
believe E(qd) = 1/2 for ∅d and for all yd. If firms actually choose not to
advertise, consumers’ beliefs are borne out in equilibrium. Now suppose for
simplicity that, say, firm m has either quality 1/4 or 3/4. Sending signal
ym = 3/4 is a “big” mistake for the type 1/4-firm and a “small” mistake for
the type 3/4-firm at the proposed equilibrium. If consumers believe that big
mistakes are less likely than small ones, they should conclude upon observing
ym = 3/4 that firm m is of type 3/4.
Second, in our least cost signalling equilibrium the extent of boasting
(yd − qd), d ∈ {m, p} is minimal. Since the extent of boasting is minimal
given firms advertise, the range where firms do not advertise [0, 4θ̂γ] is also
minimal. Put differently, in our equilibrium falsification is minimal and,
therefore, the range where firms advertise is maximal.
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4 Comparative Advertising
Let us now consider comparative advertising. Firms send messages about the
difference in quality levels x = qp−qm, the quantity consumers are ultimately
interested in. Given q̃m and q̃p are independent and uniform on [0, 1], x̃ has
density
f(x̃) =
{
1 + x, if x ∈ [−1, 0);
1− x, if x ∈ [0, 1].
If firm d ∈ {m, p} advertises, it sends a message zd. The cost of advertising
is again γ + .5(zd − x)2 where x is the true difference in quality levels which
is known to both firms. Now firm m has an incentive to distort x downwards
while firm p wishes to boost upwards. If firm d does not advertise, we will
write ∅d. Only comparative advertising is allowed. We focus on symmetric
equilibria.
Suppose firm p follows the strategy ∅p for x < x0p and zp(x) otherwise;
firm m’s strategy is ∅m for x > x0m and zm(x) otherwise. Let z′d > 0 if d
advertises alone and if both firms advertise together, d ∈ {m, p}.
Again we rule out totally unrevealing equilibria, i.e., x0p < 1, or x
0
m > −1,
or both. There is thus some range where at least one firm sends a signal and
x is revealed.
Next, we need some structure on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We assume
that at an out-of-equilibrium information set consumers believe that it was
reached with the minimum number of deviations from the equilibrium strate-
gies. A similar restriction on beliefs, termed the minimality condition has
been used by Bagwell and Ramey (1991) or Emons and Fluet (2009).
First we show that under comparative advertising the firms never adver-
tise together. The formal derivations of the following results are relegated to
the Appendix.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium the firms never advertise together, i.e., x0m < x
0
p.
To show this result we assume that firms advertise together. Yet it always
16
pays for a firm to deviate because this either changes the expected quality
differential in its favor or signalling costs fall by more than revenues.
We can now state the least-cost signalling equilibrium. The equilibrium
has the following structure:
(i) If x ∈ (−2θ̂γ, 2θ̂γ), neither firm advertises and beliefs are E(x |
∅m, ∅p) = 0.
(ii) If x ≥ 2θ̂γ, firm m plays ∅m and firm p sends the signal zp ≥ x solving
x = zp −
1− e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
. (6)
Beliefs are
E(x | ∅m, zp) = zp −
1− e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
.
(iii) If x < −2θ̂γ, firm p plays ∅p and firm m sends the signal zm ≤ x
solving
x = zm +
1− e2θ̂(zm+2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
. (7)
Beliefs are
E(x | zm, ∅p) = zm +
1− e2θ̂(zm+2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
.
To sum up:
Proposition 2: In the least-cost equilibrium if x ∈ [−1,−2θ̂γ], firm m sends
the message zm solving (7) while firm p doesn’t advertise. If x ∈ (−2θ̂γ, 2θ̂γ),
neither firm advertises. If x ∈ [2θ̂γ, 1], firm p sends the message zp solving
(6) and firm m doesn’t advertise. If one firm advertises, consumers infer the
true quality differential; if both firms do not advertise, consumers rationally
expect a quality differential of zero.
The outcome is depicted in Figure 3. First note that unlike in the case
of non-comparative advertising, the firms never advertise together. When
|x| and thus the informational value to consumers is small, the firms do not
advertise. Only when |x| is sufficiently large, the firm with the better quality
advertises while the other firm remains silent.
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Figure 3: Comparative advertising
Here we have again that if a firm advertises, except at the threshold,
it falsifies and the outcome if one firm advertises is the one with minimal
falsification. The logic is the same as described in the previous section. See
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The least cost signalling strategies 
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5 Welfare
To compare the welfare properties of our least-cost equilibria under non-
comparative and comparative advertising consider Figure 5.
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1
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2c
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d
e
f
b
d
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Figure 5: Welfare comparison
Under non-comparative advertising no firm advertises in the areas a and b;
one firm advertises in the areas c1, c2, and d, providing imperfect information
about the quality differential x; in the areas e and f both firms advertise and
provide perfect information about x. Under comparative advertising no firm
advertises in a, d, and f ; one firm advertises in the area b, c1, c2, and e,
providing perfect information about the quality differential.
Recall that welfare increases by x2/2θ̂ when consumers learn x. If only
one firm advertises and doesn’t falsify, advertising costs γ. We may, therefore,
say that advertising is efficient if the gain from informing consumers exceeds
the cost, or formally, if |x| ≥
√
2θ̂γ. Note that 2θ̂γ <
√
2θ̂γ < 4θ̂γ.
In areas a, d and f advertising is inefficient: providing perfect information
about x is not worth the expenditure γ. In area a firms don’t advertise
under both regimes, thus welfare is the same. In areas d and f firms don’t
advertise under comparative advertising. Under non-comparative advertising
one firm advertises in area d and both firms advertise in area f . Therefore,
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comparative advertising performs better than non-comparative advertising
in areas d and f .
To compare welfare in the remaining areas we need the following
Lemma 2: Variable signalling costs are higher for the non-comparative than
for the comparative advertiser in c2 and e and lower in c1.
In c2 the non-comparative advertiser has the same fixed cost but a larger
variable signalling cost than the comparative advertiser. Moreover, non-
comparative advertising provides less information. Thus, information is bet-
ter and signalling less costly under comparative advertising.
In e the information is the same under both regimes. However, each
non-comparative advertiser has a higher signalling cost than the single com-
parative advertiser: the fixed cost is the same, and variable cost is higher.
Furthermore, costs are duplicated under non-comparative advertising.
The welfare comparison is ambiguous in c1. The non-comparative adver-
tiser has a lower signalling cost than the comparative advertiser, but at the
same time provides less information.
Finally, consider region b which can be partitioned in two subareas: one
where x ≤
√
2θ̂γ and one where x >
√
2θ̂γ. In the first subarea, signalling by
the comparative advertiser is not worth its cost. Hence, non-comparative ad-
vertising does better because it does not signal at all. In the second subarea,
the comparison is ambiguous as is in c1.
To sum up: Under comparative advertising for x ∈ (2θ̂γ,
√
2θ̂γ) and
x ∈ (−
√
2θ̂γ,−2θ̂γ) firms advertise although it is inefficient to do so. Com-
parative advertising has the following virtues. Whenever firms do not adver-
tise, their decision is efficient. Furthermore, firms never advertise together,
i.e., there is no duplication of advertising expenditures. For non-comparative
advertising the picture is less clear cut. When no or one firm advertises, the
outcome may be efficient or not. When both firms advertise, the outcome is
inefficient because signalling costs are duplicated.
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Comparative advertising thus seems to do a better job than non-comparative
advertising. Since under comparative advertising firms inform consumers
directly about the quantity they are interested in and not just about one
component thereof as under non-comparative advertising, this is after all not
that surprising.
6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze non-comparative and comparative
advertising in a framework where firms may signal their quality. In equi-
librium, if firms advertise, they falsify at a cost. We consider the equilibria
entailing minimal falsification which, in turn, implies that the range over
which firms advertise is maximal. Comparative advertising performs better
in our set-up than non-comparative advertising: firms do not advertise at all
if the informational content is of little value to consumers; moreover, they
never advertise together. By contrast, under non-comparative advertising a
firm advertises if its quality level is above a threshold independently of the
rival’s quality. If both firms have high quality, both advertise leading to a
duplication of falsification costs.
We have restricted attention to the two scenarios where firms either
choose between no and non-comparative or no and comparative advertising.
An interesting topic for future research is to give firms the choice between no,
non-comparative, and comparative advertising. This extension is, however,
a lot harder to analyze than the set-up at hand. The choice of the adver-
tising format has also informational content, leading into the intricacies of
multi-dimensional signalling.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose on the contrary that there is some range [x0p, x
0
m]
where both firms advertise and the equilibrium is revealing. At, say, x0m firm m
signals zm(x0m), firm p sends zp(x
0
m), and E(x|zm(x0m), zp(x0m)) = x0m. See Figure
6.
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Figure 6: Signalling strategies
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We have to distinguish three cases.
i) Let zp(x0m) ≥ zp(x0m + ε) with ε small. If firm m deviates to ∅m consumers
observe (∅m, zp(x0m)) which is off the equilibrium path. By the minimality condi-
tion consumers think at this out-of equilibrium node that either m deviated while
p played his equilibrium strategy zp(x0m) and the underlying quality differential
is x0m; or they think that p deviated while m played his equilibrium strategy ∅m
and the underlying differential is .5x0m + .5. Consumers assign equal probability
to both possibilities. Hence, E(x|(∅m, zp(x0m)) = .75x0m + .25.
If m plays zm(x0m), his profit πm(zm(x
0
m), zp(x
0
m)) ≤ .5−x0m/2θ̂−γ. If m plays
∅m, his profit πm(∅, zp(x0m)) = .5− (1/2θ̂)(.75x0m/+ .25). m prefers ∅m to zm(x0m)
if x0m > 1 − 8θ̂γ. Likewise, p prefers ∅p to zp(x0p) if x0p < 8θ̂γ − 1. Consequently,
for γ > 1/8θ̂, x0m < x
0
p.
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ii) Let zp(x0m) < zp(x
0
m + ε) with ε small and zp(1) ≥ zp(x0m). Now suppose
p lowers the signal to zp(x0m)− ε so that consumers observe (zm(x0m), zp(x0m)− ε)
which is off the equilibrium path. Then they think with equal probability that
either p deviated and x = x0m or m deviated and x = x
′ − δ′ or x = x0m − δ; let
consumers assign probabilities b > 0 and (1 − b) to the two possibilities. Hence,
E(x|((zm(x0m), zp(x0m)− ε)) = 1/2 · x0m + 1/2 · (b(x′ − δ′) + (1− b)(x0m − δ)). For ε
going to zero, so do δ and δ′ so that E(x|((zm(x0m), zp(x0m)− ε)) > x0m. p’s revenue
increases, hence he will deviate.
iii) Let zp(x0m) < zp(x
0
m + ε) with ε small and zp(1) < zp(x
0
m). Now m deviates
to ∅m and the argument is along the same lines as in i). 
Proof of Proposition 2. a) zp as defined in (6) is a best response to ∅m when
x ≥ 2θ̂γ. The argument is similar the case of non-comparative advertising, except
that the threshold is different. When firm p does not advertise, its profit is
πp(∅m, ∅p) =
1
2
.
It starts advertising at the threshold x0p = 2θ̂γ, in which case it sends the message
z0p = x
0
p. Its profit is then
πp(∅m, z0p) =
1
2
+
x0p
2θ̂
− γ.
Equating the two yields x0p = 2θ̂γ. At x = 2θ̂γ, the firm is therefore indifferent
between advertising and not. We assume that it does. At x > 2θ̂γ, it is easily seen
that it is strictly better off by advertising.
b) ∅p is a best response to ∅m when x ∈ (−2θ̂γ, 2θ̂γ). From the argument
used to derive the threshold z0p , it is easily seen that profit is larger with ∅p than
with some message zp ≥ 2θ̂γ. We therefore need only consider the case where the
message sent is some zp < 2θ̂γ. Applying the minimality condition, consumers
infer that m played its equilibrium strategy while p deviated. They therefore infer
that the true differential belongs to (−2θ̂γ, 2θ̂γ), hence E(x | ∅m, zp) < 2θ̂γ. Firm
p’s profit is then
πp(∅m, zp) =
1
2
+
E(x | zp, ∅m)
2θ̂
− γ < 1
2
,
i.e., its profit is smaller than the profit if it does not advertise.
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c) ∅p is firm p’s best response to zm as defined as (7) when x ≤ −2θ̂γ. Consider
first the play of some zp < 2θ̂γ. Applying the minimality condition, consumers
infer that firm p deviated while m played its equilibrium strategy. Their beliefs
are therefore determined by (7), i.e., firm p’s deviation has no influence on beliefs.
Hence firm m is better off with ∅p since it avoids the cost γ.
Consider now the play of some zp ≥ 2θ̂γ. Consumers do not know which firm
has deviated but think that at most one did. Let them assign probability 1/2 to
a deviation by firm m. Their beliefs are then
E(x | zm, zp) =
1
2
(
zm +
1− e2θ̂(zm+2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
)
+
1
2
(
zp −
1− e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
)
.
Because m is playing its equilibrium strategy,
E(x | ẑm(x), zp) =
1
2
(
zp −
1− e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
)
+
1
2
x.
Firm p’s profit is then
πp(ẑm(x), zp) =
1
2
+
E(x | zp, ẑm(x))
2θ̂
− γ − 1
2
(zp − x)2 .
If it plays the equilibrium strategy, its profit is
πp(ẑm(x), ∅p) =
1
2
+
x
2θ̂
.
We need to show that πp(ẑm(x), ∅p) ≥ πp(ẑm(x), zp) for all x ≤ −2θ̂γ and
zp ≥ 2θ̂γ. Define
ϕ(x, zp) = 2θ̂ (πp(ẑm(x), zp)− πp(ẑm(x), ∅p))
=
1
2
(
zp −
1− e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
− x
)
− 2θ̂γ − θ̂ (zp − x)2 .
We want to show that ϕ(x, zp) < 0 when x ≤ −2θ̂γ and zp ≥ 2θ̂γ. Differentiating
with respect to zp yields
ϕ2(x, zp) =
1
2
(
1− e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ)
)
− 2θ̂ (zp − x) and
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ϕ22(x, zp) = 2θ̂
(
1
2
e−2θ̂(zp−2θ̂γ) − 1
)
< 0.
At zp = 2θ̂γ, ϕ2(x, zp) < 0. Since ϕ22 < 0, this implies that p would never want
to send a signal zp > 2θ̂γ. Thus, it remains to evaluate the sign of
ϕ(x, 2θ̂γ) =
1
2
(
2θ̂γ − x
)
− 2θ̂γ − θ̂
(
2θ̂γ − x
)2
.
Observe that
ϕ(−2θ̂γ, 2θ̂γ) = −θ̂
(
4θ̂γ
)2
< 0 and
ϕ(−1, 2θ̂γ) = 1
2
(
2θ̂γ + 1
)
− 2θ̂γ − θ̂
(
2θ̂γ + 1
)2
< 0.
Furthermore
ϕ1(x, 2θ̂γ) = −
1
2
+ 2θ̂
(
2θ̂γ − x
)
> 0.
It follows that ϕ(x, 2θ̂γ) < 0 for all x ≤ −2θ̂γ, which in turn implies ϕ(x, zp) <
0 over the relevant domain.
Regarding the best responses of firm m, the same arguments can be made.
The only difference is that m wants x to be perceived as small. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let sq = yp − qp. s2q is thus the variable signalling cost.
Substituting in (5) yields
sq(qp) :=
1− e−2θ̂(sq+qp−4θ̂γ)
2θ̂
, for qp ≥ 4θ̂γ.
Likewise, let sx = zp − x. Substituting in (6) yields
sx(x) :=
1− e−2θ̂(sx+x−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
, for x ≥ 2θ̂γ.
Next we show that sx(t) > sq(t) for t ≥ 2θ̂γ. Let t and t′ be such that sx(t) = sq(t′).
Thus
1− e−2θ̂(ŝq(t′)+t′−4θ̂γ)
2θ̂
=
1− e−2θ̂(ŝx(t)+x−2θ̂γ)
2θ̂
,
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which yields
t′ = t+ 2θ̂γ.
Since sx(·) and sq(·) are increasing functions, it follows that for t′ > t + 2θ̂γ,
ŝq(t′) > ŝx(t). Conversely, t′ < t+ 2θ̂γ implies ŝq(t′) < ŝx(t).
Consider now what happens in the areas c and e of Figure 5. For the com-
parative advertiser, sx = sx(x). For the non comparative advertiser, sq = sq(qp).
Since qp = x+ qm, sq ≥ sx if qm ≥ 2θ̂γ, in which case variable signalling costs are
at least as large for the non-comparative advertiser in the areas c2 and e of Figure
5. Conversely, sq < sx if qm < 2θ̂γ. In c1 signalling costs are lower with non- than
with comparative advertising .
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